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1 INTRODUCTION 
In his book Concrete and culture: a material history, 
Adrian Forty (2012) acknowledges the shift of rein-
forced concrete from the realm of vernacular experi-
ment to that of industrialized construction as being in-
strumental in concrete’s association with modernity. 
This shift from ‘mud’ to ‘modern’ took place around 
the turn of the twentieth century, when calculation 
methods, building codes and standards for reinforced 
concrete were developed, after some decades of trial-
and-error construction in different fields. While most 
attention in this respect goes to the proprietary sys-
tems developed by civil entrepreneurs, the military 
pioneering work in reinforced concrete remains 
somewhat underexposed. Nonetheless, military acad-
emies were among the first to integrate courses on 
concrete calculation or to install experimental con-
crete laboratories, for instance at the Belgian Royal 
Military Academy (Van De Voorde 2011, 134-153). 
When the war eventually broke out in 1914, the pair-
ing between military thinking and emerging industrial 
trends, such as Taylorism and Fordism, created a 
unique breeding ground for experiment in the field of 
construction. 
In the following sections, we will explore some of 
the mechanisms behind these insights. Starting with a 
short description of the adoption and dissemination of 
reinforced concrete in the military context of the 
Western Front, we then move on to the building pro-
gram of the Marinekorps Flandern and more in par-
ticular that of the Kaiserliche Marinewerft Brügge. 
The construction of the large group shelter for subma-
rines in the northern port of Bruges (Fig. 1) will be 
treated in depth, as an example of a scientifically 
managed building site, before tracking continuities in 
submarine shelter designs into the 1940s. 
Concrete matter: building the Bruges submarine pens (1917-18) 
Willem Bekers & Ronald De Meyer 
Ghent University, Ghent, Belgium 
 
ABSTRACT: Starting in August 1917, a large submarine shelter was erected in the German-occupied port of 
Bruges. Its construction completed a transition from mixed steel-and-timber shelters to all-concrete bunkers in 
this area. The new Gruppenunterstände prefigured many of the typological, technological and logistic key fea-
tures of the iconic submarine pens from World War II, when lessons learnt from the Bruges prototype were to 
be pushed to extremes. The case of the Bruges submarine pens exemplifies the scientifically managed construc-
tion site and hints at the underexposure of experimental military concrete technology in architectural construc-
tion history. It is argued that the conflict period, rather than forming a gap in an otherwise continuous evolution 
of building practice, created certain opportunities for a modern and experimental attitude towards building ty-
pology and construction. 
Figure 1. Partial view of the group shelter in the northern port of 
Bruges, 1919 (KLM-RMA). 
2 CONCRETE AND THE MILITARY 
The rapid evolution of artillery technology during the 
second half of the nineteenth century forced military 
engineers to continuously reconsider permanent for-
tification design and construction. The introduction of 
the rifled barrel around 1860 drastically increased the 
range and accuracy of siege artillery, which in turn 
resulted in new defense concepts that relied on rings 
of detached forts in advanced positions. For its part, 
the development of the explosive shell, between 
1885-90, heralded the replacement of brick and ma-
sonry by mass concrete as the preferred construction 
material for the casemates that protected fortress ar-
tillery (Mallory and Ottar 1973, 13). 
However, during the military construction boom 
before the outbreak of the First World War, the resil-
ience of mass concrete against modern artillery was 
somewhat overestimated, resulting in poor execution 
of site-cast plain concrete in many cases. Little atten-
tion was paid to an appropriate aggregate selection or 
cement content of the concrete and the homogeneity 
of the concrete was often compromised by interrup-
tions during the casting process. The failures of such 
poorly executed plain concrete, when confronted with 
contemporary artillery, became evident from field tri-
als at the French fort Malmaison in 1886 and from the 
siege of Port Arthur during the Russo-Japanese war 
of 1904-05 (Mallory and Ottar 1973, 29). In 1912, the 
Russian army, in the presence of Belgian and French 
military observers, constructed a mock-up fort on the 
island of Berezan in the Black Sea to test the effects 
of artillery fire on different construction methods. 
The results of these tests clearly demonstrated the ad-
vantages of reinforced over mass concrete, but they 
came too late to influence the design of most prewar 
fortifications (Gils 2014, 36-43). Eventually, the up-
coming war would accelerate the implementation of 
such insights. 
As it was, permanent fortifications along the West-
ern Front in 1914 displayed a variety of construction 
methods, including hybrid structures of brick and 
concrete (such as the Antwerp forts), plain concrete 
(such as the Liège and Namur forts) and reinforced 
concrete (such as some of the Verdun forts). German 
intelligence was quick to assess the effects of shellfire 
on captured Belgian and French concrete forts. The 
failure of the heavy German siege artillery to destroy 
the fort Douaumont in the Verdun sector had been en-
tirely on behalf of the fort’s construction in reinforced 
concrete with a high cement content and the imple-
mentation of certain novelties, such as an additional 
shell-bursting slab on the roof. Such innovations 
would resonate in the interwar design and construc-
tion programs of permanent fortifications in the 
1930s. 
At the same time, the stalemate on the Western Front 
sparked a massive building campaign of fieldwork 
fortifications. In 1915, the Germans were the first to 
use reinforced concrete for the construction of shel-
ters and dug-outs, and from 1916 on, its use was pre-
ferred, if not compulsory (Mallory and Ottar 1973, 
45). Reinforced concrete gradually became the stand-
ard material for the shell-protection of a wide variety 
of strongpoints, personnel shelters and observation 
posts at the front. The casting of concrete under haz-
ardous working conditions presented many difficul-
ties. Concrete aggregates needed to be fetched over 
long distances, the supply of clean water for concrete 
preparation was problematic in many occasions, and 
crucial concealment of the building sites proved dif-
ficult to maintain (Oldham 2011, 43; Vancoillie and 
Blieck 2016, 264-268). As a result, it became stand-
ard practice to prepare a dry concrete mixture behind 
the lines, before transporting it by hand to the build-
ing site. This, of course, had a negative effect on the 
overall quality of the used concrete (Vancoillie and 
Blieck 2016, 101-103).  
The difficult working conditions at the front 
prompted builders to make maximum use of local op-
portunities, which in turn paved the way for a prolif-
eration of building typologies that deviated from text-
book standards (Mallory and Ottar 1973, 49). To 
overcome the difficulties posed by the front condi-
tions, both Germans and British started to experiment 
with prefabricated concrete building blocks and 
turned towards standardized shelter designs, such as 
the renown Moir pill box (Oldham 2011, 43-67; Old-
ham, 2014). Even if prefabrication never found gen-
eral application, by 1918 the tendency was firmly es-
tablished (Mallory and Ottar 1973, 59). 
The German-built coastal defenses along the shore 
of Flanders deserve some particular attention in this 
context. Much to their surprise, the Germans captured 
the Belgian coastal ports undamaged during their ad-
vance in 1914. These  ports were to become the spear-
heads of the so-called Kleinkrieg strategy, adopted by 
the Kaiserliche Marine (Karau 2014, 1). This strategy 
aimed for a naval war of attrition, by attacking the vi-
tal traffic of commercial and military shipping in the 
English Channel with light naval units such as tor-
pedo boats and submarines. The advanced and vul-
nerable position of the bases in Flanders was a con-
stant concern throughout the war. To prevent the 
Allies from turning the German flank by landing be-
hind the lines, the Marinekorps Flandern launched a 
massive building program. The entire occupied Bel-
gian coast was reinforced with a continuous disposi-
tive of concrete-protected coastal batteries. A defense 
line of concrete strongpoints, the so-called Holland-
stellung, was established along the Belgian-Dutch 
border between the coast and the port of Antwerp. Af-
ter securing the western part of Flanders, the 
Marinekorps turned its attention towards the con-
struction of bombproof shelters for personnel, subma-
rines and dockyard facilities in the “Triangle” ports 
of Zeebrugge, Ostend and Bruges (Karau 2014, 17-
18). Here, working conditions were very different 
from those at the trenches, allowing for a more ration-
alized and systematized approach towards design and 
construction of reinforced concrete structures. The 
design briefs in this context also specifically de-
manded for larger roof spans, thus favoring building 
typologies that could make good use of innovations 
made in civilian concrete technology before the war. 
We will look deeper into this in the following sec-
tions.  
This short overview of construction methods and 
applications in permanent fortifications and field-
works, gives an idea of the prolific use of reinforced 
concrete on the Western Front. Indeed, its widespread 
usage in 1914-18 was probably the first implementa-
tion of the material on such a vast scale (Mallory and 
Ottar 1973, 51). At the same time, the conflict estab-
lished a firm association between reinforced concrete 
and warfare in people’s minds (Forty 2012, 169-170).  
3 IN SEARCH OF NEW TYPOLOGIES 
The continuing deadlock of the Western Front 
marked a transition towards a full three-dimensional 
battlefield, characterized by overhead, underground 
and submerged warfare. The introduction of these 
new tactical layers radically disrupted the traditional 
spatiotemporal experience of conflict space and 
paved the way for new building typologies. For in-
stance, the confrontation between strategic aerial 
bombing and unrestricted submarine warfare, is con-
densed in the construction of bombproof shelters in 
the German occupied Belgian ports, together forming 
the Kaiserliche Marinewerft Brügge. The Marine-
werft comprised the ports of Bruges (principal seat), 
Zeebrugge and Ostend (advanced dependencies) and 
further disposed of shipyard facilities in the ports of 
Ghent and Antwerp. The inland harbor of Bruges, 
linked by canals to the coastal ports of Zeebrugge and 
Ostend, housed the headquarters of the Untersee-
bootsflotille Flandern, that would operate around the 
British Isles and even as far as the Bay of Biscay. This 
flotilla’s increasing success in commerce raiding and 
minelaying turned the Marinewerft into a rewarding 
target for strategic aerial bombing. To keep pace with 
the ever-growing intensity and destructivity of aerial 
attacks, successive submarine shelter designs were 
developed throughout the war. Apart from some par-
ticular one-off designs, most shelters predating the 
large group shelter in the northern port of Bruges can 
be seen as one of two types (BA-MA RM 120/97).  
Cantilevering canopies (Kragunterstände), at-
tached to the existing quaysides constitute a first type. 
They come in a variety of construction methods, 
mostly using a combination of metal trusses and cor-
rugated steel. However, examples of timber structures 
are also known. The Kragunterstände are counterbal-
anced by containers filled with concrete or sand, or 
anchored directly to the quay. Incidentally, the roof is 
doubled to create a hollow explosion chamber, or to 
integrate an impact-absorbing layer of clay bags. In 
some instances, the upper roof is covered with steel 
armored plating, whereas in other cases a thin slab of 
reinforced concrete is used for this purpose. The re-
silience of these constructions against aerial bombing 
is questionable, indicating an intended use for con-
cealment rather than protection (Fig. 2). 
The second type is the so-called U-Bootsstall (U-
boat shack), a small covered dock that is excavated 
between metal sheet pile walls. Part of the removed 
earth is used to create a protective dike around the 
contour. The dock itself is covered by a roof com-
posed of timber supports, steel girders and corrugated 
steel plates. Bomb proofing is attained by absorbing 
sand layers separated by a slab of reinforced concrete 
(Fig. 3).  
The proliferation of typologies and construction 
methods up to this point indicates an empirical ap-
proach towards shelter design. Often, pragmatic rea-
sons or local conditions, such as the load bearing ca-
pacity of existing quay walls or the increasing lack of 
steel as a construction material can explain particular 
design decisions. 
Figure 3. U-Bootsstall in the northern port, 1917 (BA-MA). 
Figure 2. Kragunterstand in the west dock of the port of Bruges, 
1919 (KLM-MRA). 
 
Following a peak in aerial bombing activity in the 
summer of 1917 (a direct consequence of the renewed 
unrestricted U-boat campaign in April) the German 
navy command planned a new group shelter for the 
submarines of the Flandern flotilla. Realizing the 
flaws in earlier shelter designs, the engineers of the 
Hafenbauabteilung I Brügge-Nordhafen conceived a 
new typology of juxtaposed covered wet docks that 
relied almost entirely on the use of reinforced con-
crete (Fig. 4). The choice for concrete added the po-
tential of maximum protection to the advantage of re-
duced steel consumption, at a time when this had 
become scarce as a building material (Vancoillie and 
Blieck, 274-276). Shelling of mock-ups, constructed 
to assess the resilience of different construction meth-
ods, further tipped the balance in favor of reinforced 
concrete (BA-MA RM 104/234). Such use of a 
model-based approach towards design and engineer-
ing is a recurrent theme in the context of the World 
War I conflict (Bekers and De Meyer 2017). 
Based upon the experiences in Flanders, a similar, 
but smaller submarine shelter was erected in the Ger-
man port of Emden (BA-MA RM 104/237). In Pula, 
Croatia, the construction of nine submarine shelters 
of an unknown type was started in 1918, the latter re-
maining unfinished by the end of the war (DMA FA 
010/060). 
4 BUILDING THE SUBMARINE PENS IN THE 
NORTHERN PORT OF BRUGES 
Close reading of several archival documents provides 
a rather complete insight in the construction site of 
the Bruges group shelter. Aerial pictures taken with 
roughly three-week intervals show the building pro-
gress (KLM-RMA Aerial Picture Archive; BA-MA 
RM120/97). A photographic intelligence survey of 
the abandoned construction site by the Belgian army 
in 1919 complements this information with eye-level 
information (KLM-RMA Image Archive). Details on 
the design could be derived from German military re-
ports on building progress at the Marinewerft (BA-
MA RM120/97). 
The new bunker was planned in the northern port 
of Bruges, at the end of the partially excavated side 
dock (darse) No. 1, whose construction had been 
commenced before the outbreak of the war. From the 
initially planned 11 covered docks, only 8 bays were 
completed by the end of the war, each measuring 
around 8.80 by 62 m. To save time-consuming exca-
vation works, the bunker was built on the water. At 
the same time, this solution would overcome the lack 
of steel sheet piles for retaining walls, a notable dis-
advantage when constructing the aforementioned U-
Bootsställe. A total number of 1200 timber piles, 
measuring over 10 meter long were driven in the bot-
tom of the dock by floating steam pile drivers (Journal 
de Bruges 1951, 2).  
The overall layout of the bunker followed the out-
line of the dock, resulting in the irregularly stepped 
floorplan that characterizes the building. The main 
structure was conceived as a framework of piers, col-
umns and beams in reinforced cast-in-place concrete. 
To avoid extensive scaffolding and formwork over 
the water, the roof was composed of lined-up U-
shaped precast concrete elements. Concrete ties, 
placed at regular intervals in between those elements, 
further ensured the horizontal stability and deter-
mined the location of expansion joints in the roof. 
Similarly to the U-Bootsställe or the French forts at 
Verdun, this loadbearing structure was then topped 
with a blast roof, in this case a double reinforced con-
crete slab, followed by an elastic layer of gravel and 
on top an impact layer of double reinforced concrete. 
Its effectiveness was never assessed, the only account 
of a direct hit being three aerial bombs that ricocheted 
off the roof during an aerial bombardment in June 
1918, without doing any further damage (BA-MA 
RM 104/221). To protect the base of the facades from 
bomb damage, protruding eaves were cast along the 
contours of the roof. Besides the office space in the 
back of the building, which was cladded with a timber 
Figure 4. Plan, sections and facade of the Gruppenunterstände, 
1918 (BA-MA). 
curtain wall, the voids between the facade columns 
were filled with blast walls in brick masonry, leaving 
only small openings for access and natural lighting.  
It is tempting to consider the layout of the con-
struction site (Fig. 5) as an assembly line against the 
backdrop of emerging managerial trends, such as 
Taylorism and Fordism, which made an enormous 
impact on American and later also on European in-
dustry, particularly in Germany (Guillén 2006, 55-
63). The principles of scientific management, as for-
mulated by Frederick Winslow Taylor (1911), in-
volved the methodical analysis of the work process 
and its subsequent division into atomic tasks, the se-
lection of the appropriate work force for such tasks, 
the separation between conception and execution of 
the process and the creation of an incentive system for 
workers. Taylor (1905) had also applied this model to 
the production of reinforced concrete and the organi-
zation of the building site, thereby emphasizing the 
importance of the appropriate degree of standardiza-
tion and mechanization. Shortly before the war, Ger-
man contractors started to take a keen interest in the 
possibilities that the scientifically managed American 
building site could offer: faster, cheaper and more ef-
ficient construction through the use of mechanical 
transportation systems, building tools and production 
facilities. The result was a transnational knowledge 
transfer that would add American building technique 
and organization of concrete construction sites to Eu-
ropean technological and theoretical expertise in re-
inforced concrete (Stegmann 2016). 
The ideology of scientific management appealed 
to contractors, engineers and designers alike, but un-
surprisingly also captured the imagination of the mil-
itary. Feedback concepts, such as systematic testing 
during design phase were early on adopted in military 
engineering and were considered paramount in the 
idea of standardization in Taylor’s theories. The very 
origins of Fordism can even be traced back to the mil-
itary arms industry of the nineteenth century. In turn, 
the managerial experience gained in military circles 
during the war had its legacy in postwar civilian en-
terprise (Smith 1985, 1-39). The effects of a scientif-
ically managed approach towards construction be-
came evident in numerous examples throughout the 
war. One example at the Marinewerft would be the 
construction of a steel hangar over an existing dry 
dock in the port of Ostend, whose frames were fabri-
cated by Lehman in Düsseldorf and subsequently put 
together in place (BA-MA RM 3/7507). A similar ap-
proach was used for the fabrication of the UB-I and 
UC-I submarines that would use the group shelter in 
Bruges as a hideout. They were constructed in 
roughly fifteen pieces in German naval yards and 
transported in eight railway cars to Antwerp. Once as-
sembled, they were towed via the inland canal system 
towards their coastal home ports in the west (Karau 
2014, 42-43). 
The example of the construction site of the Grup-
penunterstände affirms such insights. The size of the 
group shelter allowed for a semi-industrialized con-
struction process, facilitated by the presence of three-
phase electric power in the port, at a moment when 
electricity in the city center was available only in a 
few private buildings and hotels (Bilé and Trips 1973, 
85-86). Materials were delivered directly on the site 
by train or via the dock, where a jetty provided imme-
diate access to a purpose-built concrete plant. Sand 
originating from earlier excavation works of the dock 
was directly available in large quantities. The mixed 
concrete was raised to a casting tower and gravita-
tionally distributed over the building site through a 
rotatable casting arm (Fig. 5). Similar vertical 
transport systems, predating the invention of the con-
crete pump in 1927, were documented in the US by 
German contractors prior to the war (Illingworth 
1972, 131-132; Stegmann 2016). From the pictures, it 
could not be determined whether the concrete was 
ready-mixed whether dry-mixed before entering the 
casting tower. Additional narrow-gauge tracks on the 
roof and at the building yard at the back of the con-
struction site complemented this transport system. 
The stretch of land behind pen No. 7 housed the pro-
duction line for the precast roof beams, sufficiently 
large to cast the roof elements for an entire bay (Fig. 
6). Timber gantry cranes displaced the finished ele-
ments to the end of this line, where they were hoisted 
by an identical roof-mounted crane. In turn, this crane 
would run on tracks over the columns to place the el-
ements on their final position over the pens (Fig. 7). 
Similar crane track systems had been used before by 
the Marinekorps for the placement of large caliber 
guns in the coastal batteries (Ryheul 2015, 240-241).  
The delivery of materials, the mixing of the con-
crete, its dispatching to the prefabrication site and the 
mechanized transportation of mixed concrete and pre-
fabricated components were all combined into a sin-
gle and compact assembly line. In doing so, the layout 
of the building site in the northern port considerably 
reduced construction time. Work started in August 
Figure 5. Aerial picture of the construction site, 1917 (BA-MA). 
1917 with the installation of the concrete plant and 
the pile foundation of the northern bay No. 8. By the 
end of the year, two bays had been completed, fol-
lowed by six more in the first half of 1918. In late 
February 1918, the first finished pens were put into 
service. No further building progress was made after 
the end of July 1918, days before the start of the allied 
campaign that eventually would end the war (KLM-
RMA Aerial picture archive). 
One question remains unanswered: who built the 
Gruppenunterstände and was there any involvement 
of German or local contractors that might explain the 
advanced mastering of concrete construction and 
building site organization? Archival documents only 
offer indirect answers to this question. The construc-
tion process was overseen by the Hafenbauabteilung 
I of the Marinekorps and was supervised by its chief 
engineer Marinebaumeister Georg Frede, himself de-
tached from the Imperial Shipyard in Wilhemshaven. 
The example of the aforementioned dry dock in Os-
tend further demonstrates how civil contractors in 
Germany were pressed into construction programs by 
the Marinewerft. At the same time, German authori-
ties were reluctant to call upon the services of Belgian 
subcontractors, the quality of whose work they occa-
sionally esteemed rather low (BA-MA RM 104/236). 
There was always the risk of sabotage or espionage 
and moreover, local companies were urged by the 
Belgian government in French exile not to cooperate 
with the German occupiers. 
Because of its particular strategic position, the Bel-
gian coastal region or Marinegebiet, had been put un-
der the extremely severe administrative regime of the 
Marinekorps, whereas most of occupied Belgium re-
mained under control of the German Generalgou-
vernement (Karau 2014, 16). This situation gave the 
Marinekorps unrestricted control over the civilian 
population and allowed for the installation of an or-
ganized program of forced labor in the Marinegebiet, 
more in particular for the purpose of military con-
struction (Thiel 2007, 132-136). The Hafenbauabtei-
lung thus disposed of a contingent of requisitioned la-
borers, whose number is estimated between 5000 and 
14,000 (Karau 2014, 22-23; Bilé and Trips 1970, 84). 
Even if German firms were involved in construction 
work in the Marinegebiet, they were not allowed to 
employ unskilled German laborers, as to prevent the 
draining of such workers from the homeland econ-
omy (Thiel 2007, 132-136). As it seems, the pairing 
of military logic and Taylorism pushed the principles 
of scientific management to extremes. Dictated by 
conflict conditions, the division between high-skilled 
engineering and unskilled labor, which initially 
seemed so promising for the development of rein-
forced concrete, was twisted into a perverse system of 
forced labor under military control, possibly assisted 
by the expertise of contracting firms.  
5 DESIGN CONTINUITY 
As early as 1920, an article published in the Journal 
of the Royal Institute of British Architects claimed 
that “certain structures erected by the Germans in 
Belgium during the war period, ... on account of their 
scale and peculiar construction, may not be without 
interest to architects”. The article continues with a de-
tailed description of the large submarine shelter, of 
which the author states that “in its simple truthfulness 
of construction it has something of the greatness of a 
classic temple” (Murrell 1920). From a construction 
historical perspective, the design of the submarine 
shelters occupies a singular position within military 
concrete construction. Here, design constraints, such 
as large spans, excavation works, deep foundations 
and building site organization, most closely relate to 
civil construction design issues. Even if the interwar 
evolution of technology sparked a dramatic increase 
in scale of the submarine pens that would be con-
structed in World War II, those basic conditions 
would not change between both world wars. 
The March 1942 issue of the periodical L’Illustra-
tion (1942) proudly announced the completion of the 
concrete submarine pens in Saint-Nazaire. Interest-
ingly, the article also included a picture of the bunker 
Figure 6. Precast concrete production line, casting tower and 
gantry crane, 1919 (KLM-RMA). 
 
Figure 7. Detail of timber gantry cranes, 1917 (BA-MA). 
in Bruges and the text identified the Gruppenunter-
stände as the ancestor of the new submarine pens, a 
point of view shared by Neitzel (1991, 9-15) and Mal-
lory and Ottar (1973, 69-70). Indeed, the juxtaposi-
tion in L’Illustration, by then a magazine under the 
supervision of German propaganda, is a strong indi-
cation that the shelter in Bruges was used at least as a 
starting point for later designs. This seems to be con-
firmed by the fact that officials of the Krupp Germa-
nia submarine shipyards in Kiel photographed the ru-
ins of the Bruges shelter in March 1943, just weeks 
before the start of the construction work on the Kon-
rad submarine bunker, located next to the Krupp 
premises in Kiel (WLB; Neitzel 1991, 93-96).  
It is beyond the scope of this text to provide a full 
account of Second Word War submarine bunker con-
struction, but some recurrent issues will be treated in 
more detail, departing from a comparison to the 
Gruppenunterstände: building typology, roof spans, 
excavation and foundation works and construction 
site management. 
Typological resemblances between the submarine 
pens in Bruges and the projects of the 1940s are ob-
vious, for instance in the juxtaposition of the covered 
docks and the protruding eaves to protect the founda-
tions and outer walls. But essential differences also 
exist. The shelter in Bruges, for instance, did not dis-
pose of the workshop facilities that were integrated in 
later designs. Moreover, its primary structure is com-
posed of a concrete framework, while the examples 
of the 1940s, with the exception of the submarine 
bunker in Helgoland, feature solid concrete walls and 
disposed of the masonry blast walls. The Helgoland 
bunker, built in 1940-41 but conceived in the late 
1930s, bears most resemblance to the Bruges subma-
rine pens and constitutes a missing link between both 
wars (Neitzel 1991, 97-99). It shares some of the 
trademark features of the bunker in Bruges that were 
completely abandoned in later projects, such as the 
skewed plan, the construction on the water, the con-
crete framework or the beveled eaves. 
The application of prefabricated roof elements for 
large spans was repeated in most of the 1940s exam-
ples. A distinction can be made between the bunkers 
in France (Brest, Lorient, Saint-Nazaire, La Rochelle 
and Bordeaux) and those constructed later in Ger-
many and Norway (Helgoland, Bremen, Hamburg, 
Kiel, Trondheim and Bergen). The French bunkers re-
lied on the use of on-site assembled steel trusses 
(called Melan-Träger) with infills of corrugated steel 
as a permanent formwork. German examples made 
great use of prefabricated trusses in prestressed con-
crete, placed side by side and embedded in concrete, 
much like the example in Bruges. One probable ex-
planation for this difference would be the increasing 
steel shortage as the war evolved, prompting engi-
neers to look for less steel-consuming options. An-
other account however involves legal disputes be-
tween German engineers (such as Hoyer or Weiss & 
Freitag) and French pioneer Freyssinet about patent 
infringements, resulting from the use of prestressed 
concrete on French soil (Grote and Marrey 2000, 42-
97). The principle of the shell-bursting slabs in 
Bruges would be further expanded. As the intensity 
of strategic bombing steadily increased, many bunker 
roofs would subsequently be equipped with addi-
tional layers of hardened reinforced concrete, relief 
chambers or bomb-protection grating. Such ideas 
were derived from the British air-space theory as de-
veloped in World War I pill box design (Mallory and 
Ottar 1973, 59). One exception is, again, the subma-
rine bunker in Helgoland, where the entire roof was 
executed in cast-in-place concrete, using an intricate 
system of movable formwork, itself made of rein-
forced concrete.  
Another issue, with greater impact on building 
speed than any other was the necessity to limit exca-
vation and foundation works. As pointed out earlier, 
similar considerations determined the choice to con-
struct the Bruges submarine bunker on pile founda-
tions in the water. Only the bunker in Helgoland fol-
lowed this example. Later bunkers would try to avoid 
pile foundations for being too susceptible for damage 
by ground-penetrating bombs and being unable to 
take on supplementary loads after construction. 
Wherever possible, the 1940s bunkers were built di-
rectly on the solid soil or bedrock. This approach of-
ten required the installation of temporary cofferdams 
and added considerably to the excavation time. The 
limitation of excavation work for wet docks was one 
of the reasons for building most of the Lorient bun-
kers away from the waterfront and to introduce a slip-
way and carriage system for the overland transport of 
submarines to their pens. 
The organization of the different construction sites 
followed the example of Bruges in the installation of 
on-site concrete plants, now using large-scale con-
crete pump networks and mechanized distribution of 
concrete through gravity slides, lorry slopes and ele-
vators. A railroad system, laid out over the construc-
tion site ensured easy evacuation of excavated earth 
and rock. Melan-Träger were put in place by roof-
mounted tower cranes, whereas a scaled-up version of 
the Bruges gantry cranes moved back and forth over 
the roof to install prestressed concrete trusses.  
A major innovation in comparison to the World 
War I example involved the administrative organiza-
tion of the construction sites. The Organisation Todt, 
a consortium of governmental administration, private 
building companies and labor resources could operate 
with substantial autonomous powers, thus opening 
the door to an even greater program of systematic 
forced labor in which most of Germany’s big building 
companies were involved. 
6 CONCLUSION 
During the First World War, submarine shelters 
evolved from improvised mixed-material structures 
to all-concrete pens. The latter displayed an advanced 
mastery of concrete construction and building site 
management, when compared to other concrete struc-
tures built at the Western Front. The Bruges subma-
rine pens anticipated, within the design constraints 
and technological framework of its time, many of the 
key features of the submarine bunkers from World 
War II and its typological, technological and logistic 
peculiarities did not remain unnoticed, even beyond 
military circles. It is uncertain to which extent exper-
tise from German or local contractors was drawn into 
the specific project in Bruges. However, when ob-
served in a wider context of battlefront construction, 
there are strong indications that a only a combination 
of military engineering, civil construction expertise 
and forced labor would have allowed for the semi-in-
dustrialized approach towards construction that came 
about in the case of the Gruppenunterstände. 
The continuous search for new building typologies 
and construction methods as a response to evolving 
military technology, of which the Bruges shelter is 
just one example, demonstrates how the conflict sig-
nificantly contributed to advances in design and 
building practice. Thus, the war was not only instru-
mental to the development, popularization and dis-
semination of reinforced concrete, but, through its 
global and industrial character, it also established a 
transnational knowledge transfer by which techno-
logical expertise and scientific management could 
meet. One could even argue that the military appa-
ratus and its ability to push industry and engineering 
to its extremes would act as an incubator for such ex-
periments. In this respect, the perception of the con-
flict as constituting a gap between prewar and post-
war building practice becomes problematic. Rather, 
some sort of catalyst effect can be perceived, that in 
the 1920s would contribute to the interest in model-
based and scientifically managed construction and 
engineering in the circles of emerging architectural 
modernism. 
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